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This paper studies the effect of sovereign risk on capital flows from rich 
to poor nations in the context of a two-country model where Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) creates positive externalities in domestic production. We 
show that if externalities are large, a developing country never expropriates 
foreign assets, and behaves as under perfect enforcement of foreigners' property 
rights, jumping to the steady state in one period. If externalities are absent, a 
developing country always expropriates foreign assets and, then, there are no 
capital flows in equilibrium, as occurs in autarky. If externalities are of a 
medium size, our model can account for scarce capital flows from rich to poor 
nations, as well as other key features of the data, such as rising-over-time 
patterns of foreign capital and FDI in developing countries. In addition, the 
model offers an economic rationale for the FDI restrictions observed across 
nations. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
At least since the work of Lucas (1990), it is well known that the standard neoclassical
growth theory has diﬃculties in explaining the observed patterns of capital ﬂows
across countries. To be precise, the theory predicts that as soon as a small developing
economy is opened to the rest of the world, it should experience so large inﬂows of
foreign capital that it instantaneously jumps to a steady state. In the data, however,
capital ﬂows from rich to poor nations are relatively scarce. Many empirical studies
advocate a hypothesis that the capital ﬂows are scarce because investing in developing
economies is subject to sovereign risk.1 For example, Williams (1975, p 265) reports
that about 20% of FDI made in low-developed countries during the 1956-1972 period
was expropriated without compensation.2 More recently, Schmidt (2000) ﬁnds that
the quality of institutions that guarantee property rights is essential for explaining a
high concentration of foreign capital ﬂows in Eastern Europe.3
The theoretical literature has already analyzed the above hypothesis. Authors
1Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996, p. 349) deﬁn es o v e r e i g nr i s ka sa n ys i t u a t i o ni nw h i c hag o v e r n m e n t
defaults on loan contracts with foreigners, expropriates foreign assets located within its borders, or
prevents domestic residents from fully meeting obligations to foreign creditors. A singularity of this
risk is that a sovereign country cannot be forced by international law to honor a contract signed
with foreign investors.
2Similar evidence is reported in Kobrin (1980, p.73) and Schnitzer (2002).
3For the 1992-1996 period, Claessens et al. (2000) calculate that few countries, such as Russia,
Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic, accounted for 80% of private capital ﬂows to Eastern Europe.
They estimate that FDI is even more concentrated, with Poland and Hungary receiving over 50%.
Moreover, they ﬁnd that the degree of institutional reforms and the country’s creditworthiness are
the main explanatory variables for this concentration. Additional evidence about the importance of
sovereign risk in Eastern Europe is provided by Boycko et al. (1995). They show that the value of
total Russian industry at stock market prices was, at that time, about 12 billion US$, roughly the
same size as a medium Fortune 500 company such as Kellogs. This was due to market expectations
that almost all of the returns of these companies would be captured either by insiders of the ﬁrms
or by the local and the federal governments.
2such as Eaton and Gersovitz (1981, 1984), Cohen and Sachs (1986), Marcet and Ma-
rimon (1992), and Thomas and Worrall (1994) conclude that sovereign risk can indeed
reduce capital ﬂows from rich to poor nations, and signiﬁcantly retard economic de-
velopment.4 One empirically relevant feature of international capital ﬂows that might
aﬀect this conclusion of the literature is the associated technological spillovers from
foreign ﬁrms to domestic ﬁrms. Indeed, a large fraction of capital ﬂows from rich to
poor countries is composed of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) typically performed
by multinational corporations.5 The technologies brought in by these multinational
corporations are, in general, superior to those available in developing countries, and
generate positive spillovers in the host nation.6 Given that expropriation of foreign
assets can lead to a loss of spillovers, the domestic country is less tempted to expropri-
ate. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the introduction of technological
spillovers from foreign to domestic producers can aﬀect the implications of growth
models with sovereign risk.
Apart from the assumption of externalities, our setup is standard. We consider a
two-country growth model, where a domestic (developing) country has a lower capital
stock than a foreign (developed) country. Both domestic and foreign agents can invest
4Other suggested explanations for the low degree of capital mobility across countries are diﬀer-
entials in human capital (Lucas, 1990), diﬀerentials in ﬁnancial intermediation costs (Imrohoroglu
and Kumar, 2003), foreign capital rationing (Barro et al., 1995), and imperfect information (Boyd
and Smith, 1997).
5Thomas and Worrall (1994) report that almost a half of total private capital ﬂows from developed
to developing nations in 1986 was in the form of FDI. Also, Claessens et al. (2000) estimate that
FDI was the largest component of private capital ﬂows to Eastern Europe during the 1992-1996
period.
6For a review of the literature on the FDI technological spillovers, see Görg and Strobl (2001).
Also, see Smarzynska (2002), and Haskel et al. (2002) for recent contributions.
3their capital in the domestic economy, but foreigners’ property rights are not perfectly
enforceable. Hence, when deciding on the amount of capital to invest, foreigners
should procure that their decisions are compatible with incentives of the domestic
country not to expropriate foreign assets (i.e., incentive compatible). If the domestic
country expropriates foreign assets, it switches to autarky and remains there forever.
We focus on the transition of the domestic economy from a low initial capital stock to
the steady state. To single out the eﬀect of sovereign risk on equilibrium, we consider
four diﬀerent institutional environments: (i) autarky, where the developing country
does not receive foreign ﬁnancing; (ii) perfect enforcement of foreigners’ property
rights; (iii) incentive compatibility; and (iv) incentive compatibility with a restricted
amount of foreign ﬁnancing, which we refer to as capital controls.
An important result of the previous literature on sovereign risk is that isolating a
country in ﬁnancial autarky is not a suﬃcient threat for preventing this country from
expropriating foreign assets, see Eaton and Fernandez (1995) for a discussion. Notice
that if foreign assets are always expropriated, foreigners never invest and there are
no capital ﬂows in equilibrium. In order to generate non-trivial capital ﬂows, it is
necessary to introduce some additional mechanism (penalty) for enforcing debt repay-
ment. Several alternatives have been suggested in the literature. Eaton and Gersovitz
(1984) and Cohen and Sachs (1986) assume that debt repudiation is accompanied by
a permanent loss of productive eﬃciency of the defaulting country. Marcet and Mari-
mon (1992) prevent expropriation by assuming that risk-averse domestic agents have
strong preferences for consumption smoothing, while risk-neutral foreign agents are
4willing to absorb random shocks aﬀecting the domestic economy. In the model by
Thomas and Worrall (1994), foreigners own all capital in the domestic economy and
transfer a part of the proﬁt to domestic agents in exchange for non-expropriating
their capital.7
In our setup, the penalty comes from the permanent loss of externalities after
the expropriation. Unlike previous literature, we study how the size of the penalty
aﬀects the properties of equilibrium by considering diﬀerent values of the externality
parameters. We ﬁnd that if externalities are zero, any positive amount of foreign
capital is expropriated; if externalities are positive but not very large, foreigners can
invest certain amount of their capital in the domestic country without being expro-
priated; and ﬁnally, if externalities are very large, expropriation never occurs since
even the extreme perfect-enforcement environment is incentive compatible. Thus, the
ﬁrst implication of our analysis is that the presence of large externalities eradicates
sovereign risk.
We investigate the implications of the model when externalities are not too large,
so that sovereign risk is still present. The regularities that we observe are as follows.
First, sovereign risk reduces capital ﬂows from rich to poor countries and induces a
much slower convergence path compared to the case when property rights of foreign-
ers are perfectly enforceable. Second, incentives to expropriate foreign capital are the
highest at the beginning and they decrease over the process of economic development.
Thus, the optimal strategy of foreign investors is to increase over time their holdings
7See Eaton and Fernandez (1995) for a review of the literature on sovereign risk. Related recent
papers are Cole and Kehoe (1998), and Kraay et al. (2000).
5of capital in the domestic country. In fact, the latter result indicates that foreign
investors can reduce the threat of default by showing their commitment to constantly
raise their presence in the domestic country. An increasing pattern of foreign capital
makes the default more costly because the defaulting country loses not only current
but also ever-growing future externalities. Furthermore, when preferences for cur-
rent consumption relative to future consumption are strong enough, not only foreign
capital stock but also FDI ﬂows rise over time, as the data suggest.8
We extensively study the welfare implications of the model.9 In the very be-
ginning, the arrival of foreign capital is always beneﬁcial for a developing economy:
it instantaneously increases the productive capital and brings positive spillovers to
production, which leads to an immediate increase in consumption and welfare. As a
result, in the short-run, the economy has the highest welfare under perfect enforce-
ment, when it reaches a steady state in one period, and it has the lowest welfare under
autarky, when no external ﬁnancing is available. In the long-run, welfare depends
o nt w oo p p o s i n ge ﬀects. The positive eﬀect is that foreigners bring spillovers, which
boost production, and the negative one is that they take away investment opportu-
nities from domestic agents. When externalities are large, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates
the second one, while when they are small, the opposite is true.
8In this respect, the experience of Eastern European and the former Soviet Union countries is
particularly relevant: these countries were virtually closed to FDI before 1990, and they experienced
increasing FDI ﬂows during the 1990s, see, e.g., Claessens et al. (2000).
9The existing literature on sovereign risk does not analyze welfare issues except of Marcet and
Marimon (1992). The welfare implications of the last paper are not directly comparable to ours, as
in their case, the debt repudiation is prevented by risk-sharing between domestic and foreign agents,
a mechanism which is absent in our case.
6When the presence of foreigners is detrimental in the long-run, a policy maker
that maximizes long-run welfare has incentives to impose restrictions on the amount
of capital inﬂows. Surprisingly, when externalities are larger, and thus potential
beneﬁts from opening the country are higher, incentives to impose capital controls
also augment. This is because externalities of a larger size mean that larger amount
of foreign capital can be brought into the country without being expropriated, which
consequently implies a larger loss in the long-run consumption and welfare of domestic
agents. Our results, therefore, can oﬀer an economic rationale for FDI restrictions
which are practiced by many developing nations.10
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
deﬁnes equilibrium and describes four diﬀerent FDI strategies. Section 3 outlines the
methodology of our numerical study and presents the results. Section 4 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
In this section, we develop a two-country growth model. The domestic country is
small and low-developed, whereas the foreign country is large and high-developed.
We assume that the domestic country has no eﬀect on prices in the foreign country.
We begin by describing the producer’s and the consumer’s sides of the domestic
economy, and we consider the foreign economy later on. Time is discrete, and the
horizon is inﬁnite.
10See, e.g., Mattoo et al. (2003) for some empirical evidence.
72.1 The domestic country
The producer side of the domestic economy is composed of a continuum of identical
ﬁrms with their names uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1].E a c h ﬁrm owns
a production technology that allows it to generate output from capital and labor.
We assume that capital is completely mobile across countries, but that FDI can be
directed only to already existing domestic ﬁrms (joint ventures). Thus, capital em-
ployed by each domestic ﬁrm, kt, includes capital of domestic investors, kdt,a n dt h a t
of foreign investors, kft, i.e., kt = kdt + kft. Foreign capital induces positive produc-
tion externalities whose size depends on the total amount of foreign capital in the
domestic country, Kft, and which cannot be internalized by competitive ﬁrms. Fur-
ther, we assume that labor is entirely immobile, so that labor used by each domestic
ﬁrm, nt, is supplied only by domestic consumers. Output produced by a domestic
ﬁrm, yt,i sg i v e nb y
yt = ϕ(Kft)f (kt,n t), (1)
where ϕ is strictly increasing, continuously diﬀerentiable with ϕ(0) = 1,a n df has
constant returns to scale, is strictly increasing in both arguments, strictly concave,
continuously diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes the appropriate Inada conditions. Due to the
presence of externalities, the production function (1) has increasing returns to scale.11
This speciﬁcation implies that foreign capital aﬀects the Total Factor Productivity
11It is well known in the literature that the assumption of increasing returns to scale can lead
to multiplicity of equilibrium (see, e.g., Matsuyama, 1991). To rule out the multiplicity, we shall
assume that the externalities are not too large.
8(TFP) of the domestic ﬁrm.12 Note that the production technology (1) allows to
produce output also in the absence of foreign capital.13




{ϕ(Kft)f (kt,n t) − rtkt − wtnt}, (2)
where rt and wt are the domestic rental rates of capital and labor, respectively. Since
in our setup, externalities cannot be internalized, from the individual ﬁrm’s viewpoint,
the production function displays constant returns to scale, so that the equilibrium
rental prices are equal to the corresponding marginal products. Our assumption of
a continuum of identical domestic ﬁrms uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]
implies that Kft = kft. Moreover, we assume that workers supply labor inelastically
and normalize nt to unity, nt =1 . Thus, the rental prices are
rt = ϕ(kft)f1 (kt,1), (3)
wt = ϕ(kft)f2 (kt,1). (4)
where fi is the ﬁrst-order partial derivative of f with respect to i-th argument.
The consumer side of the economy consists of an inﬁnitely-lived representative
agent who makes the consumption-savings decisions to maximize lifetime utility. At
each point of time, the agent considers the possibility of expropriating foreign capi-
tal. We assume that if the agent expropriates foreign capital, the domestic country
12The idea that the eﬃciency of a backward economy is positively aﬀected by the level of activity
of foreign ﬁrms that come from more technological advanced countries goes back to Findlay (1978).
Like us, he proxies this level of activity by the amount of foreign capital.
13We assume that FDI from poor to rich countries does not bring externalities, so that such FDI
are never observed in equilibrium.
9will loose all the externalities resulting from foreign capital and will stay in autarky









ct + kdt+1 =( 1− d + rt)kdt + wt, (6)
expropriate if ICC is not satisﬁed, (7)






A(kdt + kft), (8)
where kd0 > 0 and the sequence of foreign capital {kft}
∞
t=0 is given. Here, ct is
consumption; δ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor; d ∈ (0,1] is the depreciation rate of
capital; and V A (kdt + kft) is the value function in autarky. The momentary utility
function u(c) is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave and
satisﬁes lim
c→0 u0 (c)=∞.
2.2 The foreign country
The foreign country has the same fundamentals (including the discount factor, δ,a n d
the depreciation rate of capital, d) as the domestic country does. We assume that
the foreign country is so developed that it is situated in the steady state, with the
14This assumption is in line with Eaton and Gersovitz’s (1984) one. They argue that FDI brings
not only tangible but also intangible capital, e.g., superior managerial skills. If expropriation occurs,
foreigners leave the country, and intangible capital is no longer available and cannot be replaced.
10gross interest rate, Rss, being equal to15
Rss =1− d + rss =1 /δ, (9)
where rss is the net interest rate in the steady state. The foreign country will be
interested in investing in the domestic country as long as the gross rate of return
on capital in the domestic country, Rt, is higher than that in the foreign country,
Rt >R ss, and as long as its capital is not expropriated, i.e., ICC (8) is satisﬁed.
Formally, the problem of foreign investors is therefore to maximize period-by-period
proﬁts by choosing supply of capital to the domestic country
max
kft
[Rt − Rss]kft subject to (8), (10)
with Rt being deﬁned by
Rt =
½
0 if expropriation occurs,
1 − d + rt otherwise, (11)




We restrict attention to a recursive Markov equilibrium where all the decisions are
made according to time-invariant policy functions of the current state. There is only
one state variable in our model, which is the domestic capital stock, kdt.T h ef o r e i g n
capital stock, kft, is not a state variable because it is decided on period-by-period
basis according to (10), (11). Therefore, we deﬁne an equilibrium by two policy
15It is well known that the steady-state interest rate in Ramsey-type frameworks is pinned down
exclusively by the individual discount factor, δ.
11functions, the consumption function and the foreign capital function,
ct = q (kdt) and kft = g (kdt), (12)
respectively, such that:
(i) the sequence {kt}
∞
t=0 solves the proﬁt maximization problem of the domestic
ﬁrm (2), given the normalization for labor, nt =1for all t, and the sequences for
prices, {rt,w t}
∞
t=0, and for externalities, {kft}
∞
t=0;
(ii) the sequence {ct,k dt+1}
∞
t=0 solves the utility-maximization problem (5) − (8),
given the sequences for foreign capital, {kft}
∞
t=0,a n df o rp r i c e s ,{rt,w t}
∞
t=0;
(iii) the sequence {kft}
∞
t=0 solves the proﬁt maximization problem of the foreign
investors (10), (11), given the sequences for the domestic variables {rt,c t,k dt}
∞
t=0;
(iv) all markets clear;
(v) non-negativity constraints are satisﬁed, ct ≥ 0, kdt+1 ≥ 0 and kft ≥ 0 for all t.
2.4 Alternative FDI strategies
The speciﬁc FDI strategy adopted by the foreign country, kft = g (kdt), will depend
on the expropriation policy chosen by the domestic country and on the rate of return
on capital in the domestic country relative to that in the foreign country. To gain
intuition into how these two factors aﬀect equilibrium, we consider four alternative
environments.
Environment 1: Autarky. The autarkic case can be obtained within our
framework by disregarding ICC (8) in the problem of the domestic consumer (5)−(8)
12and by assuming that the domestic country expropriates foreign capital independently
of whether it is beneﬁcial from the economic point of view or not. Since Rt =0<R ss,
the solution to (10), (11) is
kft = g (kdt)=0 , (13)
i.e., given that foreign capital is always expropriated, FDI is never supplied to the
domestic country.
Environment 2: Perfect Enforcement. This is the case when foreign capital
is never expropriated meaning that ICC (8) is again disregarded. In the absence of
expropriation, the solution to (10), (11) is to supply FDI to the domestic country
until the rates of return to capital in both countries are equalized, Rt = Rss,w h i c h
together with (3) implies
ϕ(g(kdt))f1 (kdt + g (kdt),1) = rss. (14)
Equation (14) implicitly deﬁnes the function g (kdt).
Environment 3: Incentive Compatibility. This corresponds to our main
setup where the domestic country makes decisions about expropriation of foreign
capital by following the utility maximizing strategy (7), i.e., by expropriating when-
ever ICC (8) is not satisﬁed. Since foreign investors are aware of the possibility of
default, they always choose FDI, which satisfy ICC (8). Taking into account that the
domestic country starts below the steady state and assuming that it monotonically
converges to the steady state in the limit (which was the case in all our numerical
13experiments), we have Rt >R ss for all t<∞. Thus, the optimal strategy of foreign





A[kdt + g (kdt)]. (15)
That is, given the expropriation break-point of the domestic country, foreigners choose
such FDI that expropriation never occurs, and given the amount of FDI chosen, the
domestic country has no incentives to expropriate. Condition (15) implicitly deﬁnes
the function g (kdt).
Environment 4: Capital Controls. This is the case when the domestic coun-
try imposes explicit capital controls by restricting the amount of foreign capital in
the economy, kft ≤ g for all t. As in Environment 3, we assume that the equilibrium
choices satisfy ICC (8). Clearly, the outcome of the capital controls crucially depends
o nt h es i z eo fg.I np a r t i c u l a r ,i fg is very small, we are close to the autarkic environ-
ment, while if g is suﬃciently large, we get the incentive-compatible environment (as
the restriction kft ≤ g never binds). We restrict attention to one speciﬁc value of g,
which is the largest constant foreign capital satisfying ICC (8) for all t:












Condition (16) endogenously determines the exact value of g. Note that in Environ-
ment 4, it could be that, in some periods, constraint (16) holds with equality, whereas
in other periods, it holds with a strict inequality.
143 Model’s implications
The model described in Section 2 does not in general admit a closed-form solution.
Therefore, we investigate the model’s implications by simulation. First, we describe
the methodology of our numerical study and then, we present the results.
3.1 Methodology
To carry out the numerical analysis, we assume that the momentary utility function






,γ > 0. (17)











t ,α ∈ (0,1),µ , β ≥ 0. (18)
Most parameter values employed in the simulation are standard. In the benchmark
case, we assume the discount factor of δ =0 .96, the depreciation rate of d =0 .1,
the capital share of α =0 .36, and the risk-aversion coeﬃcient of γ =1 .A s f a r
as the externality parameters µ and β are concerned, we do not have any empir-
ical estimates available. We therefore explore the role of externalities in equilib-
rium by considering a number of alternative values for (µ,β). As one can reason-
ably expect, when externalities become small (i.e., µ and β become close to zero),
our incentive-compatible Environments 3 and 4 converge to autarky (Environment
1), whereas when externalities are getting large, they approach perfect-enforcement
(Environment 2). To illustrate these tendencies, we consider three alternative pairs
15(µ,β) ∈ {(0.01,0.1), (0.03,0.3), (0.036,0.36)} referred to as “small”, “medium”
and “large” externalities, respectively. The middle pair corresponds to our benchmark
parameterization and allows us to clearly see the eﬀect of externalities on equilibrium.
Regarding the initial condition, in the benchmark case, we assume that the domestic
country starts with 60% of its steady-state capital stock, kss, i.e., k0 =0 .6kss,a n d
in addition, we run a sensitivity experiment k0 =0 .2kss. Finally, we complete our
analysis by studying the robustness of the model’s implications with respect to the
parameters α and γ.
To compute the equilibrium, we use a numerical method that solves the Euler
e q u a t i o no nag r i do fp r e s p e c i ﬁed points. A description of the method used is provided
in the appendix. After computing the optimal policy rules, we simulate 50-periods
time series for key variables. The results are shown in Figures 1 and 2.
3.2 Results
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium transitional dynamics of the four environments
considered. In columns 1, 2 and 3, we present the results for the cases of medium,
small, and large externalities, respectively. As we see, the externality size aﬀects
quantitatively but not qualitatively the model’s predictions, so that we observe the
same regularities in all three columns of the ﬁgure.
Initially, the domestic country has a lower capital stock than does the foreign
country, which creates a relatively large interest rate diﬀerential between the two



























































































Case: µ=0.03, β =0.3 (benchmark)
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Case: γ =5, α =0.36, k
0=0.6k
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0.4 Autarky         




























Case: γ =1, α =0.36, k
0=0.2k
ssenforcement case, where the latter coincides with the steady state interest rate in the
foreign country). Because of this diﬀerential, the domestic country starts receiving
FDI once it opens its capital market to the foreign country. The amount of FDI,
however, diﬀers substantially across environments. Under perfect enforcement,F D I
is the largest among all the environments considered and is suﬃcient for the domestic
country to jump to a steady state in one period. Under incentive compatibility,F D I
is reduced because of the threat of default. Finally, under capital controls,F D Ii s
reduced even further because in addition to ICC, FDI should satisfy the upper-
bound restriction. Thus, similar to the previous literature, our model suggests that
sovereign risk can be important for explaining why so little FDI goes to low-developed
countries even though such countries have many investment opportunities.16
The ﬁgure shows that in the incentive-compatible case, the amount of foreign capi-
tal held in the domestic country displays an increasing pattern. To gain intuition into
this result, we shall recall that the domestic agents have diminishing marginal utility
of consumption. The consequence is that as the economy grows and its consumption
level rises, the marginal incentives to expropriate foreign capital decline. Since for-
eign investors behave in a manner consistent with ICC (8), they raise their capital
stock held in the domestic country whenever the expropriation incentives decrease.
The rising pattern of foreign capital produced by our model is in line with empirical
evidence documented in Gertler and Rogoﬀ (1990) that the level of foreign debt in
developing economies is positively correlated with their GNP.
16See, e.g., Cohen and Sachs (1986), Marcet and Marimon (1992) and Thomas and Worrall (1994).
19Note that in the incentive-compatible case, foreign investors can hold a higher
capital stock without being expropriated than in the capital-controls case. In fact, this
result is related to the previously discussed implication about an increasing pattern
of foreign capital in the incentive-compatible case. Speciﬁcally, if foreign capital is to
increase over time, a country that expropriates foreign capital looses not only current
but also substantial future externalities that foreigners would bring otherwise. As
a result, domestic agents have less incentives to expropriate foreign capital under
an increasing proﬁle than under a constant proﬁle. Our analysis has therefore an
important policy implication: foreign investors can reduce the threat of default by
showing their commitment to increase FDI in the future.17
We now turn to the welfare implications of the model. We can distinguish three
eﬀects of foreign capital on the domestic economy. First, the arrival of foreign capital
results in an immediate increase in the capital stock used in domestic production.
Second, foreign investors bring spillovers that raise the domestic technology level.
Third, foreigners take away from domestic agents a fraction of the output produced.
The ﬁrst two eﬀects increase domestic consumption and welfare, while the last eﬀect
reduces them. In the short-run, the ﬁrst eﬀect is the most important one: the domes-
tic country has always the highest welfare under perfect enforcement, where it reaches
the steady state instantaneously, and it has the lowest welfare under autarky, where
17Thomas and Worrall (1994) reach the same conclusion in the context of a dynamic bargaining
game between the domestic country and the foreign investor. In their model, the domestic country
does not expropriate foreign capital today because it has an option to expropriate much larger
amount of foreign capital in the future. In contrast, our mechanism relies on beneﬁts from future
spillovers, which increase over time.
20foreign capital is not available. In the long-run, only the second and the third eﬀects
matter, and the direction of the net eﬀect depends on which of these two dominates.
For example, in the benchmark case (see column 1), the third eﬀect dominates the
second one, so that the domestic economy has a higher welfare under autarky than
it does under perfect enforcement. In sum, at the beginning of transition, when the
country is low-developed, the arrival of foreign capital is always beneﬁcial, however,
as the country develops, the presence of foreigners can become detrimental. In partic-
u l a r ,i nt h ee x t r e m ec a s eo fperfect enforcement, foreigners take away all investment
opportunities from domestic agents in the very ﬁrst period, making the domestic
economy remain forever at the same level, as it was at the beginning of transition.
An important ﬁnding in the ﬁgure is that the eﬀect of FDI on the domestic agents’
long-run welfare is non-linear: going from autarky ( w i t hn oF D I )t ot h eincentive-
compatible and the capital-controls environments (with some FDI) increases welfare,
whereas going from the latter environments to the perfect-enforcement one (with
much FDI) reduces welfare. This indicates that there is some amount of FDI that
maximizes the steady-state welfare of domestic agents and that such an amount
is lower than FDI in the incentive-compatible case. The latter result follows from
the fact that in the long-run, the capital-controls environment with less FDI always
implies a higher welfare than does the incentive-compatible environment with more
FDI. That is, unless the government of a developing country controls the entry of
FDI, the domestic country will end up with a larger amount of foreign capital than
21it is socially desirable.18
We shall now describe how the externality size aﬀects the properties of the equilib-
rium. When externalities are small (see column 2), foreigners increase TFP relatively
little, but they take away much of the investment opportunities from the domestic
agents. As a result, the domestic country has strong incentives to expropriate foreign
capital. In the limit, when externalities are zero, any positive amount of foreign cap-
ital violates ICC and hence, is expropriated. Thus, our environments with lack of
commitment, namely, the incentive-compatible and the capital-controls ones, deliver
transition paths that are close to those in autarky, and lead to much higher levels
of long-run welfare than the perfect-enforcement environment. In contrast, when
externalities are large (see column 3), foreigners increase TFP signiﬁcantly, so that
the domestic country has little incentives to expropriate foreign capital. In the limit
now, when externalities are very large, expropriation never occurs because even the
perfect-enforcement environment satisﬁes ICC. The consequence is that the perfect-
enforcement environment always oﬀers a larger level of welfare than autarky.A l s o ,
the incentive-compatible paths are located close to those under perfect-enforcement
and far from those under autarky.
Moreover, the externality size aﬀects the country’s incentives to practice capital
18Notice that the long-run welfare implications of the model cannot be inferred by looking at total
output produced in the domestic economy. The reason is that the fraction of total output that goes
to foreigners, which does not contribute to domestic consumption and welfare, diﬀers among the four
environments considered. Indeed, the perfect-enforcement economy has larger total output than do
both the incentive-compatible and capital-controls economies, which in turn have larger total output
than does the autarkic economy. As we see, this output ordering diﬀers from the one according to
the level of long-run welfare.
22controls. To see this point, let us look at the diﬀerences in long-run welfare under
the incentive-compatible and the capital-controls environments. If externalities are
weak, incentive-compatible FDI is small, so that restricting it further has little eﬀect
on the equilibrium. In contrast, if externalities are strong then a relatively large
amount of FDI is consistent with ICC. A sw ec a ns e ei nF i g u r e1 ,b yr e s t r i c t i n g
the amount of FDI, the domestic country can signiﬁcantly increase long-run welfare.
Thus, we have the following surprising and apparently contradictory result: the higher
is the potential gain from the presence of foreign capital, the more incentives has the
domestic country to control FDI ﬂows.
We next study the robustness of the model’s predictions to variations in the para-
meters γ and α, which are the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
consumption and the capital share in income, respectively.19 The corresponding re-
sults are shown in Figure 2, columns 1 and 2. An increase in γ reduces the consumers’
willingness to sacriﬁce present consumption for future consumption and, therefore,
reduces domestic investment. An increase in α also makes domestic investment less
attractive because it leads to weaker diminishing returns to capital accumulation.
The consequence is that the speed of convergence goes down. One ﬁnding here is
particularly remarkable: in both cases, FDI displays an increasing pattern, which
contrasts with a weakly decreasing pattern observed under the previously considered
parameterizations. To gain intuition into this result, we shall recall that when an
19A larger value of α can be justiﬁed by interpreting capital input in the model to be a composite
of physical and intangible capital inputs in the data. To make this interpretation consistent with
the reasoning in footnote 14, we shall assume that the intangible foreign capital is more productive
than the domestic capital.
23economy is low developed, incentives to expropriate foreign capital are very strong
because an expropriation makes it possible to instantaneously increase consumption,
however, as the economy becomes more developed, consumption increases and incen-
tives to expropriate foreign capital reduce. An increase in γ or α can accentuate this
eﬀect to such an extent that it dominates the other opposing eﬀect that drives FDI,
diminishing capital returns, and make the FDI pattern become increasing, as we have
in the ﬁgure. This implication of our model agrees with the empirical evidence on
transition economies, see Claessens et al. (2000).
We ﬁnally explore the role of initial conditions in the equilibrium dynamics by
starting the simulation from an initial capital stock equal to 20% of its steady-state
value, instead of 60% in the benchmark case (see column 3 in Figure 2). We observe
that a lower initial capital stock results in stronger incentives to expropriate foreign
capital in initial periods — note that the incentive-compatible amount of foreign capital
is about 1.1 in the benchmark case, and it is about 0.7 in the current experiment.
A lower initial capital stock leads to a lower participation of domestic capital in
production under perfect enforcement, because in this environment foreign capital
makes the domestic economy go to a steady state in one period. Consequently, the
long-run diﬀerence in the level of welfare between the perfect enforcement environment
and the other cases visibly increases with a reduction in the initial capital stock
(compare the life-time utility paths in Figure 1, column 1, and in Figure 2, column
3). In this respect, the impact of a lower initial capital stock on equilibrium is similar
to the one of a weaker external eﬀect (see column 2 in Figure 1).
244C o n c l u s i o n
It has been shown in the previous literature that sovereign risk can signiﬁcantly re-
duce capital ﬂows from rich to poor nations. In this paper, we investigate how the
implications of models with sovereign risk can change if we allow for positive external-
ities from foreign to domestic producers. We ﬁnd that in the absence of externalities,
expropriation always occurs, while in the presence of very large externalities, expro-
priation never occurs, so that sovereign risk completely disappears. In an intermediate
case, when externalities are not too large, a fear of loosing externalities by the do-
mestic country can sustain a certain amount of capital trade in equilibrium. Thus,
the externality size plays a crucial role in the properties of equilibrium.
One noteworthy implication of our model is that a certain presence of foreigners
is always beneﬁcial for a developing country. Indeed, our two incentive-compatible
environments generating positive capital trade are Pareto superior to the autarkic
environment both in the short- and long-run. This does not always mean, however,
that the more foreign capital arrives into a domestic country, the better oﬀ such a
country is. In fact, the highest level of the long-run welfare is obtained in our capital-
controls environment, where the presence of foreigners is artiﬁcially restricted by the
government. Consequently, our model provides an economic rationale for the FDI
restrictions, which are commonly practiced by developing countries.
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AA p p e n d i x
This appendix describes the Euler equation method that we used for solving the
model. Since expropriation of foreign assets never occurs in our model, then the
solution to the problem (5) − (7) parameterized by the utility function (17) satisﬁes
the standard Euler equation
c
−γ
t = δ (ct+1)
−γ (1 − d + rt+1). (19)
We parametrize the asset demand of the domestic country by a function of the
current asset holdings, kdt+1 = h(kdt). The grid for asset holdings consists of 100






. To evaluate the asset function outside
the grid, we use a linear interpolation.
27By combining Euler equation (19) and budget constraint (6),w eo b t a i n
kdt+1 =( 1− d + rt)kdt + wt− (20)
−{h(kdt)(1− d + rt+1)+wt+1 − h(h(kdt))}[δ (1 − d + rt+1)]
−1/γ ,







(kdt + g (kdt))
α−1 ,





(kdt + g (kdt))
α−1 ,
with kft = g (kdt) being the optimal decision rule for foreign investors.
We then implement the following iterative procedure:
• Step 1. Fix some asset function on the grid, h(kdt).
• Step 2. Use the function h(kdt) to calculate the right side of Euler equation (20)
in each point of the grid. The left side of (20) deﬁnes the new asset function,
∼
h(kdt).
• Step 3. Compute the asset function for next iteration
≈




h(kdt)+( 1− η)h(kdt),η ∈ (0,1].
For each point of the grid, for which
≈








h(kdt) at the corresponding boundary value.
• Iterate on Steps1−3 until
≈











10−9,w h e r ek·k is the L2 distance.
For the autarkic and perfect-enforcement environments, the function g (kdt) is
known from the beginning: in the former case, we have g (kdt)=0 , and in the latter
case, we can approximate g (kdt) by solving equation (14) numerically for each point
of the grid.
For the incentive-compatible and the capital-controls environments, g (kdt) is not
known beforehand and is to be approximated simultaneously with h(kdt). Speciﬁcally,
we deﬁne some function g (kdt) on the grid, compute the domestic asset function
h(kdt), as discussed above, solve for the corresponding value function and check ICC
(8) in each point of the grid. For the incentive-compatible environment, we iterate
on the grid-values of the function g (kdt) until we ﬁnd ones that make ICC (8) to be
satisﬁed with equality in each point of the grid. For the capital-controls environment,
we iterate on the value of g until we ﬁnd g satisfying (16).
28